Into the Seething Depths
Examining History as a Chaotic System Through the Lens of War and Peace
I. THE HARE OF HISTORY
“On the second of October a Cossack, Shapovalov, who was out scouting, killed one hare and wounded another.”[1] So begins Leo Tolstoy’s account, from Book XIII of War and Peace, of the Battle of Tarutino.[2] “Following the wounded hare,” Tolstoy continues, Shapovalov “made his way far into the forest and came upon the left flank of Murat’s [French] army, encamped there without any precautions.”[3] Afterwards, as Shapovalov related his discovery to comrades in the Russian camp, word trickled up the chain of command and reached the ears of Mikhail Kutuzov — General Field Marshal of the Russian army — who promptly “gave the order” to attack the French host, thus commencing the Battle of Tarutino, which would force Napoleon to abandon Moscow and begin his retreat from Russia.[4]
War and Peace is fiction, not history. Shapovalov is a character in Tolstoy’s novel, and his hankering for hare did not actually alert Kutuzov to the whereabouts of the vulnerable French army. While historians differ on the details, it seems that intentional “reconnaissances” on the part of the Russians exposed Murat’s position and inspired the decisive Russian attack.[5] Nevertheless, the question Tolstoy raises is historical. What Tolstoy is asking, to paraphrase the historian John Lewis Gaddis in On Grand Strategy, is whether history can pivot on something as seemingly insignificant as a hare.[6]
That question bedeviled Tolstoy throughout War and Peace, and it is the subject of the novel’s philosophical, and oft–ignored, Second Epilogue.[7] Contemporaries, from Ivan Turgenev to Vladimir Lenin, indicted the chapter as “farcical,” “weak,” and “trivial” in the decades after the novel’s debut.[8] Critics have agreed, calling the Second Epilogue a “blemish” on War and Peace, a vapid interruption that is “of no importance” to the arc of an otherwise masterful novel.[9] But, for the few who have fairly considered War and Peace’s final line of inquiry — including Isaiah Berlin, a twentieth–century philosopher whose 1954 book, The Hedgehog and the Fox, investigated Tolstoy’s historical ideation — the historiographical argument outlined in the Second Epilogue is “the central issue round which the novel is built” and Tolstoy is as much a philosopher as he is a novelist.[10]
Tolstoy arrives at the question — can history pivot on a hare? — by first examining another: “what is the power that moves peoples?”[11] This, for Tolstoy, is “history’s essential question,” and, he argues, it is one historians tend to answer inadequately.[12] When asked a basic question of cause and effect, historians often respond that an effect occurred due to “a multiplicity of variously directed forces.”[13] The problem, as Tolstoy sees it, is that the causes historians identify are always “incommensurate” with the effects to which they are affixed.[14] As an example, he points to historians of the Napoleonic Wars, the subject of War and Peace, who attempt to explain the movement of millions across Europe as the result of strong–willed leaders, ideas, or some combination of similar forces. Those explanations fail, he contends, because they do not explain “how component forces equal to one A gave a resultant equal to a thousand times A.”[15] In short, the causes historians trumpet cannot equal the effects they describe, because “the only conception that can explain the movement of the peoples is that of some force commensurate with the whole movement of the peoples.”[16] So, for Tolstoy, there is only one satisfactory explanation of the Napoleonic Wars: “the sum of human wills produced the Revolution and Napoleon, and only the sum of those wills first tolerated and then destroyed them.”[17] Asking ‘what power moves the peoples,’ Tolstoy responds, “the movement of nations is caused not by power, nor by intellectual activity, nor even by a combination of the two as historians have supposed, but by the activity of all the people who participate in the events.”[18]
Acknowledging that the movement of history results from the combined activities of all participants brings Tolstoy to an original conclusion. In an apt metaphor, he argues that “the differential of history” — differentials, in mathematics, describe how minute changes in input can transform the entire output of a function — is “the individual tendencies of men,” what he calls “infinitesimals.”[19] What Tolstoy means, Berlin explains, is that “individual wills… sometimes transform the lives of communities.”[20] A small individual action, as a differential, can determine the course of history. But if infinitesimals are the differential in the equation of history, does that, then, make Tolstoy’s fictitious account of Tarutino correct? Can history pivot, as Tolstoy envisions it pivoting, on a hare?
The answer, for Tolstoy, is yes and no. ‘Yes,’ he might reply, in the sense that each infinitesimal, no matter how small, is a cause, a force, that bends the arc of history. The fate of a continent, in that sense, can hinge on the hopping of a hare. That hopping impacts the output of the historical equation; that it could change the balance of a battle, that a battle could change a war, that a war could change a continent, is well within the realm of possibilities. But, since the movement of history results from the sum of all the infinitesimals involved, the negative is also true:
… no event has any marked–off or definable beginning… and thus [there is] no way of entering into the endless succession of causes–and–effects so as to establish just where the specific causes for an event, such as the War of 1812, could be justly considered to have had their inception.[21]
History is not the result of one thing; it is the result of everything. So, history might be able to pivot on a hare — but only after it has arrived, through a succession of causes, back at the hare itself.
The idea of infinitesimals, in the words of the Tolstoy scholar R.F. Christian, is the bedrock of War and Peace’s “central positive thesis” — the argument, implicit throughout the novel and explicit in its Second Epilogue, that history results from the interaction of “an infinitely large number of infinitely small human actions.”[22] But the origins of Tolstoy’s thesis remain opaque. Some critics, including Christian, believe that Tolstoy was a “lover of history” and suppose the idea stemmed from his interest in the subject.[23] Others, like Berlin, think the roots of Tolstoy’s historical argument lie not in his “interest in the past,” but instead in a philosophical “desire to penetrate to first causes, to understand how and why things happen as they do and not otherwise.”[24] Pinpointing the exact spark that led Tolstoy to his philosophical argument in War and Peace is a Sisyphean task, one Tolstoy himself might have thought impossible, if not pointless, in light of his own views on causation. Nevertheless, before following Tolstoy’s historical argument to its conclusion, it is worth examining the influences that, to varying degrees, shaped his ideas.
While Christian and Berlin differ on whether Tolstoy enjoyed reading about the past, both agree that War and Peace’s Second Epilogue arose, at least in part, out of a deep dissatisfaction with the histories he did read. Throughout War and Peace, Tolstoy criticizes the “strangeness and absurdity” of almost all historical explanations — which, he argues, are “unintelligible” because they associate a small number of causes with a disproportionately large effect, and thus “furnish no reply to history’s essential question.”[25] But his main line of criticism is one that links with his conception of infinitesimals: it is an indictment of historians who work “for the aggrandizement of the great man” and attempt to explain the movement of history as the result of an individual will.[26] In a scathing, satirical passage — which he claims is not “caricature,” but rather a “mild expression” of the kinds of arguments advanced by such historians — Tolstoy describes the conduct of the Napoleonic Wars to illustrate the silliness of great–man theories:[27]
At that time there was in France a man of genius — Napoleon. He conquered everybody everywhere — that is, he killed many people because he was a great genius. And for some reason he went to kill Africans, and killed them so well and was so cunning and wise that when he returned to France he ordered everybody to obey him, and they all obeyed him. Having become an Emperor he again went out to kill people in Italy, Austria, and Prussia. And there too he killed a great many. In Russia there was an Emperor, Alexander, who decided to restore order in Europe and therefore fought against Napoleon. In 1807 he suddenly made friends with him, but in 1811 they again quarreled and again began killing many people. Napoleon led six hundred thousand men into Russia and captured Moscow; then he suddenly ran away from Moscow, and the Emperor Alexander, helped by the advice of Stein and others, united Europe to arm against the disturber of its peace. All Napoleon’s allies suddenly became his enemies and their forces advanced against the fresh forces he raised. The Allies defeated Napoleon …[28]
The events that make up the Napoleonic Wars, for Tolstoy, are too disparate and too large to be explained as the result of a few strong–willed individuals. It is logical, then, to suggest that the idea of infinitesimals might have arisen out of Tolstoy’s intense reaction to such explanations — that, as Christian contends, through reading them Tolstoy “became convinced that the history of such periods cannot be confined to a catalogue of the conscious deeds of a few so–called great men, but is nothing short of the totality of unobtrusive and largely unconscious actions of the people as a whole.”[29]
One long episode in War and Peace reveals the logic that might have led Tolstoy from his revulsion towards great–man theories to his belief in infinitesimals: the Battle of Borodino, another pivotal moment in Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812. Napoleon, in Tolstoy’s account, barely influences the outcome of the clash. After examining Napoleon’s plans for the battle “without religious awe of his genius,” Tolstoy concludes that “not one of these was, or could be, carried out.”[30] By way of example, he points to a specific order Napoleon issued — for the batteries under the command of two generals, Pernetti and Fouche, to “overwhelm” the enemy with cannon fire before an infantry assault.[31] This order, Tolstoy explains, “could not be done” because the target Napoleon had selected was too far from where he had arranged the French cannon.[32] The shelling, therefore, could not begin until “the nearest commanded, contrary to Napoleon’s instructions, moved them forward.”[33] Tolstoy concludes, therefore, that the outcome of Borodino, and the outcome of history more generally, “depends on the coincidence of the wills of all who take part in the events.”[34]
But the roots of that opinion, which undergird the central historical argument of War and Peace, originate as much in Tolstoy’s experience of history — fighting on the battlefields of the Caucasus (1851–54) and Crimea (1854–55) — as they do in his reading of history. As Rosamund Bartlett explains in her 2011 biography, Tolstoy: A Life, Tolstoy’s stint in the army “made a deep impression on him.”[35] In the Caucasus, Tolstoy took part in a “relentless, intense and very dangerous” campaign against Chechen tribes in the forested foothills that surround modern–day Grozny.[36] And in Crimea, he served in the brutal, eleven–month Siege of Sevastopol, a battle of enormous scale and destruction that claimed over a hundred thousand Russian lives.[37] His experience in those conflicts inspired Tolstoy to write about war — he wrote “The Raid” in the Caucasus and The Sevastopol Sketches, his first major break as an author, in Crimea — and also likely nurtured his ideas on infinitesimals.[38] One passage, from “Sevastopol in May,” the second installment of the three–part Sketches, hints at how witnessing the realities of the battlefield might have influenced his thinking:
… the soldiers took up their muskets and the battalion advanced… he went on like a drunken man. Suddenly thousands of fires flashed on all sides, with whizzings and crackings. He gave a yell and ran forward, because they all yelled and ran; then he tripped and fell over something. It was the company chief, wounded at the head of his troops, who took the yunker for a Frenchman and seized his leg. Pesth pulled his feet away and got up. Some one threw himself on him in the darkness, and he was almost knocked over again.[39]
Personal experience taught Tolstoy to understand the battlefield as chaos. An individual soldier, he understood, was little more than a “drunken man,” stumbling, groping, and shoving his way forward. That understanding must have inspired his later conclusions, that the outcome of a clash could not be explained without understanding the individual wills of thousands of drunken men acting and reacting to the wills around them.
The third category that bears investigation, in determining the roots of Tolstoy’s thoughts on infinitesimals, is the influence of the philosophers before him. Berlin explains: “That he read widely, and was influenced by what he read, cannot be doubted.”[40] Chief among the philosophers who influenced Tolstoy was Jean–Jacques Rousseau, whom the author professed to have “‘worshipped.’”[41] But in Rousseau there is little that dovetails with Tolstoy’s conception of infinitesimals; it seems, in this, that other thinkers influenced his ideas — notably, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Joseph de Maistre, Arthur Schopenhauer, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.
Hegel is a distinctive member of that quartet because Tolstoy disagreed with him. Hegel believed that history moved directionally, following a Weltgeist or world spirit that encouraged “historical development.”[42] Certain individuals could channel that world–spirit to advance history through their wills: Hegel called Napoleon, whom he saw as one such individual, “the world spirit on horseback” after witnessing the general parade through his city of Jena.[43] Such ideas could not be more incompatible with Tolstoy’s theory of infinitesimals — to say nothing of the author’s distaste for Napoleon — but, as Berlin acknowledges, Tolstoy “grew up during the heyday of the Hegelian philosophy,” and “the historicism of his time doubtless influenced” his writing.[44] Hegel’s historicism, then, probably had a similar effect on Tolstoy’s historical argument as his reading of great–man histories, inspiring a negative reaction that pushed him to search for other explanations, such as infinitesimals.
If the link between Hegel’s historicism and infinitesimals is negative, then the relationship between Tolstoy’s idea and the philosophies of Maistre, Schopenhauer, and Leibniz is positive: in their work the building blocks of infinitesimals can be found. Berlin, who first links Tolstoy to Maistre, proves that the Russian read the Savoyard’s work — in the middle of writing War and Peace in November of 1865 Tolstoy wrote in his diary, “‘I am reading Maistre’” — and shows how Maistre, in writing about the “incalculable” small factors that determine the outcome of battles, might have informed Tolstoy’s thinking.[45] “Maistre,” Berlin further argues, “regarded the battlefield as typical of life in all its aspects, and derided the generals who thought that they were in fact controlling the movements of their troops and directing the course of the battle.”[46] When compared with Tolstoy’s description of Borodino, the parallel is striking.
Ideological similarities exist also in the work of Schopenhauer, whom Tolstoy called “‘the greatest thinker of [his] century’” in a draft version of War and Peace.[47] In The World as Will and Representation, Schopenhauer writes about the insignificance of the individual, who is “finite in infinite space and time,” whose “place and duration are finite parts of what is infinite and boundless.”[48] In Schopenhauer’s declaration that each individual is nothing but a “drop in the ocean” of life — that each individual will is “diminished to nothing in the boundless world” — Tolstoy might have found the basis for his infinitesimals.[49] Just as Schopenhauer believes that individuals are insignificant, a puny component of an infinitely grand cosmic backdrop, Tolstoy argues that infinitesimals, though perhaps insignificant on their own, together set the path of history. According to the American consul in St. Petersburg in 1868, Tolstoy was “very enthusiastic about Schopenhauer” while writing the final volumes of the novel, including the Second Epilogue.[50] It is likely, then, that the author would have found at least a modicum of inspiration in the work of the German philosopher.
The third thinker whose work merits discussion differs from both Maistre and Schopenhauer in that no evidence exists to suggest Tolstoy ever read Leibniz directly. Nevertheless, it was Leibniz — a founding father of calculus, alongside Isaac Newton — who first coined the term ‘infinitesimals’ in the late seventeenth century.[51] Thus, though perhaps unwittingly, “Tolstoy uses the language of Leibniz” in War and Peace.[52] But similarities between Tolstoy and Leibniz’s infinitesimals persist beyond the nomenclature. Just as Tolstoy describes infinitesimals as the differential of history, Leibniz uses infinitesimals to describe the differentials of equations that hinge on mutually dependent variables.[53] Both see that the output of equations with variables that depend on one another — for Leibniz, calculus; for Tolstoy, history — can swing wildly based on infinitely small changes to initial variables. Though the two were separated in time by almost two centuries, by native tongue, and by field of study, there appears to be a clear link in their thinking. That link does not seem like coincidence: while writing War and Peace, Tolstoy exchanged ideas with the mathematician Sergey Urusov, whom he met in Sevastopol.[54] As the scholar Boris Eikhenbaum notes, Urusov introduced Tolstoy to the mathematical ideas that permeate the Second Epilogue of War and Peace.[55] Urusov, therefore, might have brought Leibniz to Tolstoy, a fact that would help explain the development of Tolstoy’s essentially Leibnizian framework for infinitesimals.
Tolstoy did not live in a vacuum. He was influenced, as all thinkers are, by those who came before him. Nevertheless, the conception of infinitesimals that Tolstoy sets forth in War and Peace is original. From his dissatisfaction in the histories of his time, from his experiences in war in the Caucasus and Crimea, and from absorbing the philosophies that preceded his, Tolstoy arrives at a profound idea: that “the movement of history” arises from the interaction of “innumerable arbitrary human wills.”[56] Now, with an understanding of how Tolstoy developed that idea, we can consider the broader historical argument of War and Peace that stems from it.
The sum of countless infinitesimals is what moves history. Thus, for Tolstoy, history hinges on a hare just as much as it hinges on Napoleon. But there is a wrinkle to that conclusion, one that elucidates the complex nature of Tolstoy’s historical argument. History is “continuous.”[57] History does not stop and start; it persists, unceasingly, with the passage of time. In Book XI of War and Peace, Tolstoy invokes one of Zeno’s famous paradoxes to demonstrate the problem this creates:
There is a well known, so–called sophism of the ancients consisting in this, that Achilles could never catch up with a tortoise he was following, in spite of the fact that he traveled ten times as fast as the tortoise. By the time Achilles has covered the distance that separated him from the tortoise, the tortoise has covered one tenth of that distance ahead of him: when Achilles has covered that tenth, the tortoise has covered another one hundredth, and so on forever. This problem seemed to the ancients insoluble. The absurd answer (that Achilles could never overtake the tortoise) resulted from this: that motion was arbitrarily divided into discontinuous elements, whereas the motion both of Achilles and of the tortoise was continuous.[58]
History is similar to motion. Bound by the passage of time, it cannot be divided into discontinuous elements. Each cause blends with countless others to form an effect, and each effect in turn becomes a cause, which then fuses with others, in the formation of the next effect, the next cause. Using the verb ‘hinge’ — or asking a question with the verb ‘pivot’ — makes little sense, then, because, as the scholar John Henry Raleigh puts it, “everybody and everything is connected by an infinity of causes to what had preceded them in the historical sequence and thus an infinite causal regress opens out to the rear.”[59] So it is the sum, and the sum alone, of these innumerable infinitesimals that moves history.
Together, Tolstoy’s belief in infinitesimals and in the continuous nature of history cohere, informing the vision of history that the author sets forth in War and Peace. He believes that history is moved by an innumerable number of infinitesimals — causes, such as the hopping of a hare, that are infinitely small — which cannot be distinguished from one another, because each infinitesimal influences, and is influenced by, the next. Tolstoy believes that, since history is continuous, each cause is affected by an innumerable number of past causes in an infinite causal chain, which renders questions of cause and effect pointless. In mathematical terms, he believes that history is a function whose output is determined by an infinite number of infinitely small and mutually dependent variables whose values are also informed by the infinite number of infinitely small variables that preceded them in time; that a small change in one infinitesimal — the differential of the equation — can spark a cascading and unpredictable change both in the other variables of the function and in the output of the function itself. As Berlin writes, Tolstoy believes that history is unpredictable and, in practice, unexplainable:
The world is a system and a network: to conceive of men as “free” is to think of them as capable of having, at some past juncture, acted in some fashion other than that in which they did act; it is to think of what consequences would have come of such unfulfilled possibilities, and in what respects the world would have been different, as a result, from the world as it now is. It is difficult enough to do this in the case of artificial, purely deductive systems, as for example in chess, where the permutations are finite in number, and clear in type — having been arranged so by us, artificially — so that the combinations are calculable. But if you apply this method to the vague, rich texture of the real world, and try to work out the implications of this or that unrealised plan or unperformed action, the effect of it on the totality of later events — basing yourself on such knowledge of causal laws and probabilities as you have — you will find that the greater the number of “minute” causes you discriminate, the more appalling becomes the task of “deducing” any consequence of the “unhinging” of each of these, one by one; for each of the consequences affects the whole of the rest of the uncountable totality of events and things, which unlike chess is not defined in terms of a finite, arbitrarily chosen set of concepts and rules.[60]
Tolstoy believes that history is erratic, but he does not believe that it is undecipherable. In War and Peace, he offers a possible solution, a means of understanding the chaos of the historical system he has set forth, which he takes from mathematics: “Only by taking infinitesimally small units for observation (the differential of history, that is, the individual tendencies of men) and attaining to the art of integrating them (that is, finding the sum of these infinitesimals) can we hope to arrive at the laws of history.”[61] Historians should abandon their futile pursuit of cause and effect, he argues. Instead, an “ideal historical science” would ask historians to treat infinitesimals as calculus treats differentials.[62] Just as Pierre–Simon Laplace envisioned an ideal demon that could analyze the world down to the “tiniest atom,” Tolstoy hopes for an ideal historian who could calculate even the smallest of infinitesimals, integrate them into the function of history, and from there understand the laws of the historical equation.[63] Thus, though Tolstoy understands history, in practice, as chaotic, he believes that a method lies within the madness, if only discernable by his theoretical ideal historian.
II. THE CHAOS OF WAR AND PEACE
At the beginning of the 1960s, a meteorologist named Edward N. Lorenz “‘brought about one of the most dramatic changes in mankind’s view of nature since Sir Isaac Newton,’” in the words of the committee that awarded him the prestigious Kyoto Prize in 1991.[64] While running a simple computer simulation of weather patterns, Lorenz stumbled upon a seeming error in his model which led to a series of discoveries that would inspire the founding of modern Chaos Theory.[65] But the intellectual seeds of Chaos Theory were sown far before Lorenz tested his weather model — scientists point to the work of French mathematician Jules Henri Poincaré, for example, as a nineteenth–century antecedent — and, as I will argue, its basic principles were anticipated by Tolstoy in his philosophical Second Epilogue to War and Peace.[66] In this section (II), I will connect Tolstoy with Chaos Theory and argue not only that the Russian author intuited the scientific revelations of the 1960s and ‘70s, but also that the historical system he envisions — one that, defined by infinitesimals and the continuity of time, results in practical disorder — is chaotic and similar to the ones studied by modern chaoticians like Lorenz.[67] But, before embarking on that argument, we must develop a basic[68] understanding of the development and key tenets of Chaos Theory.
The “paradigm shift” that Lorenz sparked was accidental, the result of a rounding error.[69] His weather model was simple: it used a series of differential equations, which described the relationship between various phenomena such as temperature and pressure, to forecast the weather based on a set of initial conditions he selected.[70] And it was deterministic: the model would always return the same output for the same set of initial conditions.[71] One afternoon in 1961, wanting to examine a specific sequence of data from the latter half of a previous run, Lorenz decided to start his model halfway through instead of running the entire simulation again. To provide the computer with initial conditions, he inputted numbers from the midpoint of the earlier trial straight from the pages of the printout it produced. To his surprise, the new run, which should have been identical, deviated sharply from the old.[72] As James Gleick writes in his popular history of the field, Chaos: Making a New Science, Lorenz “might as well have chosen two random weathers out of a hat.”[73] Lorenz soon realized the problem: to save space on paper, the computer rounded the output numbers it sent to print to the third decimal place.[74] But the computer itself stored figures up to the sixth decimal place.[75] The difference — an initial condition of .506 instead of .506127 — should have been inconsequential, but its impact on the simulation was enormous.[76] Weather, Lorenz came to understand, was a system of “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” — small changes in input could result in astonishing swings in output — a phrase that scientists would soon ascribe a host of other so–called chaotic systems, as Chaos Theory swept across scientific fields in the 1970s and ‘80s.[77]
But the discovery of such systems, where a miniscule change to initial conditions can cause a dramatic difference in outcome, predated Lorenz. The first to imagine such a system appears to have been James Clerk Maxwell, a nineteenth–century Scottish mathematician sometimes described as “the first person to understand chaos.”[78] Writing in 1873, Maxwell imagined what he called “unstable” systems, where “an infinitely small variation in the present state may bring about a finite [noticeable] difference in the state of the system in a finite time.”[79] Maxwell, however, limited his consideration of such systems to nonscientific writing. It was not until Poincaré, almost two decades later, that the idea of chaos — though not the term — was introduced to the scientific community.
Poincaré arrived at the idea while studying the three–body problem. He had tried to solve the infamous[80] astronomical problem — which requires determining the motion of three celestial bodies interacting under the pull of their mutual gravitational forces — during a competition celebrating the birthday of King Oscar II of Sweden in 1899.[81] For a brief moment, Poincaré thought he had reached a solution, until one of his editors noticed an error in his calculations. The issue, Poincaré realized, was that forecasting the movement of three celestial bodies in a dynamical system — that is, a system that changes with time — demanded increasingly precise, and increasingly impossible, measurements of the initial conditions of the bodies, from their velocities to their masses, as time increased. The system, he wrote in 1908, worked so “that small differences in the initial conditions produce very great ones in the final phenomena.”[82] As such, “a small error in the former will produce an enormous error in the latter.”[83] “Prediction becomes impossible.”[84] Poincaré’s conclusion, writes June Barrow–Green in Poincaré and the Three–Body Problem, was the “first mathematical description of chaotic behavior in a dynamical system.”[85] And, though his conclusion would remain largely unappreciated during his lifetime, Poincaré had identified chaos.
Lorenz popularized his findings — and, indirectly, the findings of Maxwell and Poincaré — in a 1972 address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The title of his lecture, “Predictability; Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” is what inspired the naming of the term ‘Butterfly Effect.’[86] This, Lorenz acknowledged, was a “frivolous” way of describing sensitive dependence on initial conditions, but it was pithy, it became popular, and it helped ignite a revolutionary movement in science.[87] Three years later, that movement would come to be called Chaos Theory after the publication of a short paper titled “Period Three Implies Chaos” by Tien–Yien Li and James A. Yorke building on Lorenz’ work.[88] Li and Yorke proved, mathematically, that even single variable systems could exhibit chaotic behavior whenever their equations had a point of period three or, in layman’s terms, a point that cycled through exactly three distinct states — meaning that chaos could arise naturally in systems far simpler than Lorenz’ weather model.[89] Their proof, Gleick explains, was “so contrary to intuition” among scientists that it sparked an “‘electric shock’” across various fields.[90] A little more than decade after Lorenz ran his weather model, the pioneering mathematician and early adopter of Chaos Theory Stephen Smale explains, scientists started to realize that “chaos is a characteristic of dynamics[91] and dynamics is the time evolution of a set of states of nature.”[92]
Chaos coursed through the scientific community, transforming disciplines from chemistry, which found a new framework for understanding mysterious reactions, to biology, where Robert May and Stephen Jay Gould discerned “chaotic” dynamics both in animal population statistics and in evolutionary patterns.[93] And as the revolution unfolded, a new branch of scientists — chaoticians — started to uncover traits of chaos beyond Lorenz’ initial ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions.’ One of the leading discoveries was that chaotic systems, paradoxically, had order to them. Working out of the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Mitchell Feigenbaum discovered one such example in 1975.[94] Wanting to understand the “point of transition” — the moment a system transformed from orderly to erratic — Feigenbaum discovered what has since been described as a “natural law” of chaos.[95] He realized that, when simple systems become chaotic, their transition “exhibits an orderly periodic [sic] behavior.”[96] He even quantified the exact rates at which such systems change en route to chaos, two figures now known as Feigenbaum’s constants.[97] Chaos, Feigenbaum proved, obeyed certain laws; his observation would push others, similarly, to look for methods in the madness.
Another discovery that found order within chaotic systems emerged alongside Feigenbaum’s universal rates: the strange attractor. Identified both by Lorenz and the French mathematician David Ruelle, these are shapes around which chaotic systems trend.[98] The nomenclature of the term helps to clarify its meaning: the word ‘strange’ describes the shape itself, which is nonstandard and complex, and ‘attractor’ explains that chaotic systems revolve around the shape.[99] Chaotic systems, when graphed, are shown to move around their attractors — the chaotic system below, for example, revolves around two cylindrical inner shapes:[100]

The ‘Lorenz attractor’ is an example of a strange attractor, as derived from Lorenz’ system of differential equations.
As such, strange attractors, much like Feigenbaum’s constants, “illustrated the stability and the hidden structure” of chaotic systems that “otherwise seemed patternless.”[101]
Science’s understanding of chaos, and of the rules that govern chaotic systems, continued to advance after the discoveries of Feigenbaum and Ruelle. But the most notable of those advancements, for our purposes, came from two thinkers: Benoît Mandelbrot and Per Bak. Mandelbrot discovered fractals, shapes which are infinitely complex but self–similar across scale, in the 1970s:[102]

An example of fractal, created by the equation for the Mandelbrot set.
Fractals, Mandelbrot realized, showed that a simple iterative process — such as the Mandelbrot set[103] — could produce infinitely complicated results. Furthermore, Mandelbrot demonstrated that fractals were “the geometry of nature,” explaining that the winding of a river, the branching of a tree, and a host of other natural phenomena followed a geometric logic that was both chaotic and patterned.[104] Chaoticians including Lorenz soon realized that chaos had a “fractional dimension”: from turbulence to weather patterns, chaotic systems — with patterns that persisted at both micro and macro levels — were self–similar across scale.[105] Mandelbrot thus “provided an indispensable language” for Chaos Theory: his fractals allowed theorists to visualize chaotic complexity and to explain, without complicated formulas, how chaos could arise from simple, iterative equations like the one Li and Yorke set forth in 1975.[106]
A few years after Mandelbrot wrote his seminal book, The Fractal Geometry of Nature, Bak arrived “at the edge of chaos” by studying sandpiles.[107] A physicist who specialized in phase transitions, Bak wanted to understand how “enduring structures,” like a pile of sand on a beach, “can unexpectedly collapse.”[108] In a 1987 experiment, Bak and his colleagues simulated thousands of sandpiles, adding a single grain of sand to each pile until it toppled.[109] Bak realized that, once enough sand had been added to a sandpile, predicting which next individual grain would topple the pile was impossible: “because we [could] explain with utmost precision what has happened,” he wrote, “[did] not mean that we [could] predict what will happen.”[110] He and his colleagues could be certain, however, that each pile would not collapse at least until a certain threshold of sand had been added to the system. That observation sparked a remarkable conclusion: that sandpiles are systems of “self–organized criticality,” that is, that they arrive at points of instability — the edge of chaos — where any small disturbance could unpredictably trigger a wide range of outcomes, from the total collapse of the pile to a minor shift in its sands.[111] Bak’s research thus demonstrated a core tenet of Chaos Theory — that “simple” systems “may show unpredictable behavior” — and offered a method, not dissimilar to Feigenbaum’s, for understanding when a system as elementary as a sandpile might approach unpredictability.[112]
The design of this whistle–stop tour of Chaos Theory is to show the basic tenets of chaos, and to shed light on their development, before returning to the historical argument at the end of War and Peace. A chaotic system is (1) dynamic and time dependent. A chaotic system is also (2) vulnerable and sensitive to initial conditions — to borrow Lorenz’ example, chaotic systems are those where a difference in the thousandth decimal place of an input could transform the output. A chaotic system also tends to (3) be deterministic in theory but unpredictable in practice. Recall Poincaré’s epiphany, that the three–body problem should be solvable, except for the fact that our abilities of measurement are too imprecise; we can never establish anything more than an “approximation” of initial conditions, and thus prediction is impossible in practice.[113] However, as recent research has revealed, a chaotic system also tends to (4) follow certain rules and patterns — from being self–similar across scale to behaving similarly en route to chaos — which, when studied, can extract some semblance of method from the madness. With those conclusions in mind, let us return to the historical argument of War and Peace.
Gleick writes in Chaos that, long before Lorenz stumbled upon Chaos Theory in 1961, “pieces of the puzzle” had been identified, “by Poincaré, by Maxwell, even by Einstein.”[114] But before any of them — indeed, before any scientist — approached chaos, Tolstoy intuited its meaning. In the Second Epilogue to War and Peace, Tolstoy tries to solve the puzzle of history. He asks the essential question — “‘what moves it?’” — he identifies the pieces, and he puzzles out an answer.[115] His answeris not scientific; it is philosophical. But the picture those puzzle pieces create, the answer Tolstoy furnishes to history’s chief question, is an argument, made a century before the discovery of Chaos Theory, that history as a system is chaotic.
Proving that the system Tolstoy sets forth in War and Peace is chaotic demands demonstrating that it meets the criteria of chaos I have outlined above. The first requirement of a chaotic system — that it be dynamic and time–sensitive — is one Tolstoy easily meets. Unlike, for example, Hegel, who according to the philosopher Sidney Hook “denies the reality of time” in the The Phenomenology of Spirit, Tolstoy sees time as a critical component of history.[116] Indeed, Tolstoy’s whole historical argument stems from his observation that history exists in a state of “absolute continuity of motion” that is “not comprehensible to the human mind.”[117] The principal “error” he notices in the histories of his time — an error which spurs his search for another means of understanding history — emerges from historians’ “arbitrary division of continuous motion into discontinuous elements.”[118] Thus, the very foundation of “Tolstoy’s system,” as Raleigh puts it, is “temporal” and the system is dynamic.[119]
The second characteristic of a chaotic system, we have established, is sensitive dependence on initial conditions. The historical system of War and Peace, in this respect, mirrors Lorenz’ weather system. The movement of history, for Tolstoy, hinges on infinitesimals, which he aptly describes as the “differential[s] of history.”[120] Since “the only conception that can explain the movement of the peoples is that of some force commensurate with the whole movement of the peoples,” each infinitesimal — each individual will — affects the course of history.[121] And, since history is continuous, each infinitesimal bleeds into the next, meaning that one miniscule change to an infinitesimal — a differential in the historical equation — can cause an extreme change in history’s outcome. Tolstoy’s rendition of the Battle of Tarutino is illustrative: a Cossack chases a hare into the woods where, to his surprise, he finds a defenseless French army, a discovery that inspires a decisive Russian attack, the beginning of a string of defeats for Napoleon that culminate in Waterloo, the following day.[122] We previously asked, after examining this episode from War and Peace, if history could pivot on a hare. But we might also have asked, ‘can the hop of a hare in Russia topple a regime in Paris?’ and mirrored Lorenz’ famous question, “does the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil set off a tornado in Texas?”[123] In the right set of circumstances, Tolstoy’s historical system can pivot on a hare just as Lorenz’ weather model can pivot on a butterfly. Both systems exhibit sensitive dependence on initial conditions.
Tolstoy’s historical system shares another important trait with Lorenz’ weather model: it is deterministic. While the notion of infinitesimals might lead one to assume that Tolstoy believes history to be contingent — since its outcome can hinge on the hopping of a hare — his system, Berlin explains, espouses an “inexorable historical determinism” that Tolstoy places “on irrefutable theoretical grounds.”[124] That determinism can be found in his integration metaphor. If a historian could measure those “infinitesimally small units” and discover “the art of integrating them,” Tolstoy claims, then the course of history could be discerned, even forecasted.[125] He thus believes, Berlin makes clear, that “the lives of human beings no less than that of nature are determined.”[126] But there lies a problem, similar to the one Poincaré encountered in his struggle to solve the three–body problem. Historians, like astronomers, are not omniscient. They are unable to “plot the course of every drop of which the stream of history consists”; their knowledge of initial conditions is too imprecise to forecast history’s movement.[127] Poincaré’s conclusion thus applies to Tolstoy’s historical system: since precise measurement of history’s infinitesimals, its initial conditions, is impossible, “prediction becomes impossible.”[128] The historical system of War and Peace, then, matches our third criterion of chaos: it is deterministic in theory but impossible to predict in practice.
But while Tolstoy’s system is unpredictable, it does appear to follow certain patterns and rules. One of those patterns resembles Bak’s sandpiles. At the beginning of the First Epilogue of War and Peace, Tolstoy writes about Europe in the wake of the second Treaty of Paris, which ended the Napoleonic Wars:
Seven years had passed. The storm–tossed sea of European history had subsided within its shores and seemed to have become calm. But the mysterious forces that move humanity (mysterious because the laws of their motion are unknown to us) continued to operate.
Though the surface of the sea of history seemed motionless, the movement of humanity went on as unceasingly as the flow of time. Various groups of people formed and dissolved, the coming formation and dissolution of kingdoms and displacement of peoples was in course of preparation.
The sea of history was not driven spasmodically from shore to shore as previously. It was seething in its depths…[129]
Imagine this “sea of history” as one of Bak’s sandpiles. At some point in the past, the pile arrived at its critical state, and a single grain of sand could, and indeed did, spark an avalanche, or, to continue Tolstoy’s metaphor, a single flow of water could, and did, cause a storm on the sea of history. But the sandpile has collapsed and its state is no longer critical. Still, the dynamics of the system persist — for Bak, another grain of sand is added every so often; for Tolstoy, “the mysterious forces… [continue] to operate” — but the sandpile appears stable and the ocean, calm. Nevertheless, the next collapse is brewing: an avalanche for the sandpile and “the coming formation and dissolution of kingdoms and displacement of peoples” for the ocean of history. The sandpile is simmering in its heights; the sea of history is “seething in its depths.” Tolstoy seems to think that history adheres to a structure not unlike self–organized criticality: that, while the same forces continuously operate, the sea of history cannot be “driven spasmodically from shore to shore” until the depths have seethed sufficiently, until history’s sandpile has reached a certain height.
History, for Tolstoy, obeys “laws.”[130] One of them, which he observes in War and Peace, resembles Bak’s law of self–organized criticality. But he believes that more such laws must exist. He thinks that studying history as the system he has envisioned — examining the “common, infinitesimally small elements by which the masses are moved” — should point historians “towards an understanding of the laws of history.”[131] According to Berlin, “Tolstoy saw clearly that if history was a science, it must be possible to discover and formulate a set of true laws of history.”[132] Coupled with his allusion to a kind of pattern that parallels self–organized criticality, Tolstoy’s explicit yearning for the discovery of history’s laws confirms his belief that some kind of order existed within the disorder of his historical system. In this way, the system he explores in the final pages of War and Peace meets our final criterion for chaos.
Before Poincaré, Maxwell, and Einstein, it was Tolstoy who anticipated the fundamental ideas of Chaos Theory. The historical system he outlines in the Second Epilogue of War and Peace mirrors, in several respects, the chaotic systems that are the subjects of the field Lorenz’ discovery kickstarted. A driving aspect of Tolstoy’s system is time; it is bound by the “absolute continuity of motion” and so it is dynamical.[133] It exhibits sensitive dependence on initial conditions: a change in the thousandth decimal place of a single of its infinitesimals — in, say, the direction of a hare’s hopping in the forests south of Moscow — can transform the system’s outcome. Sharing that trait both with Lorenz’ weather model and Poincaré’s three–body problem also means that Tolstoy’s system, despite being deterministic “on irrefutable theoretical grounds,” is unpredictable in practice.[134] But within that seeming disorder, Tolstoy discerns order — he identifies a rule, resembling Bak’s self–organized criticality, to which he believes history adheres — and he calls upon historians to look for other laws that might explain the madness. Tolstoy thus intuited the tenets of Chaos Theory: though he wrote War and Peace a century before the language of chaos would become mainstream, the thrust of his historical argument is that history is chaotic. If ever an updated history of the field is written, the name of the Russian novelist must not be omitted.
Of the millions who have read War and Peace, few stick around long enough to consider the book’s Second Epilogue. Even critics tend to ignore the appending chapter, deeming it “an aberration in the work that distracts from the merits of the novel.”[135] A handful of unconventional scholars have bucked that trend, including Berlin in The Hedgehog and the Fox and Gaddis in On Grand Strategy. But neither Berlin[136] nor Gaddis — nor, for that matter, any other significant scholar save Joe Barnhart, who observed without elaboration that Tolstoy’s historical argument “dips into contemporary Chaos Theory” — connected War and Peace to Chaos Theory.[137] That helps to explain why Tolstoy’s name does not appear in any of the many histories of the field, from Gleick’s Chaos to M. Mitchell Waldrop’s Complexity to Stephen Kellert’s In the Wake of Chaos.[138]
Although the connection between Tolstoy and Chaos Theory has not been sufficiently explored, historians have written about the similarities between their field and the “revolutionary new science” of chaos.[139] In 2002, Gaddis wrote The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past, concluding in a chapter called “Chaos and Complexity” that Chaos Theory is “much like history.”[140] He arrives at his conclusion after observing, like Tolstoy in War and Peace, that there are no independent variables in history, since “causes always have antecedents.”[141] Historians, he continues, must therefore reject “the idea that one can identify, without reference to all that has preceded it, such a thing as an independent variable.”[142] Gaddis then makes the connection explicit: since history is bound by “the passage of time” — and since no variable can truly be considered independent — it resembles, as a system, Poincaré’s three–body problem, where “there was no clear relationship between independent and dependent variables; everything depended on everything else.”[143] It is, he realizes, a system of “sensitive dependence on initial conditions.”[144] And, as a science that “distinguishes between the predictable and the non–predictable, that doesn’t depend upon reducing complexity to simplicity, that acknowledges — indeed relishes — the interdependency of variables,” Gaddis posits that Chaos Theory resembles his own field of history.[145]
Gaddis was not the first historian to connect the two fields; instead, as he acknowledges in The Landscape of History, it was Henry Brooks Adams in 1907. Adams is widely credited as being the first writer to integrate the ideas of Chaos Theory with history, as the literary critic N. Katherine Hayles explains in Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science.[146] Adams devoted the second half of his autobiography, The Education of Henry Adams, to crafting a historical theory that could explain the life he had lived and, in turn, the historical system that had shaped it. And the “dynamic theory of history” that Adams envisioned, Hayes explains, is rooted in “chaos.”[147] Without examining the specific details of his theory — Adams’ argument is often opaque, metaphorical, and personal — the essence of his “theory of the universe” can be distilled into a sentence: Adams believed that “chaos was the law of nature.”[148] Adams reached that conclusion, in part, thanks to the help of Poincaré. After examining the mathematician’s frustrated attempt to solve the three–body problem, Adams realized that “history and mathematics agreed.”[149] “Chaos,” he concluded, “was a primary fact” of the universe.[150]
If, from the publication of The Education of Henry Adams in 1918[151] onwards, historians have observed chaos in their field, why is it that none of have made the connection to Tolstoy? Part of the answer lies in the fact that War and Peace’s Second Epilogue is often overlooked. But even historians such as Gaddis, who read both Berlin and Tolstoy, who even commented on the Second Epilogue in On Grand Strategy, have failed to connect the dots. Gaddis came close: in The Landscape of History, he connected his field to Chaos Theory and mused that the tools of the new science might enable historians to “discov[er] the nature of history.”[152] And, in On Grand Strategy, he digests Tolstoy’s historical argument, he understands the meaning of Cossack Shapovalov and the hare, and he even remarks that Tolstoy sits on “the edge of chaos.”[153] The dots are there, across The Landscape of History and On Grand Strategy, but go unconnected. Although individual links have been established — Berlin and others have connected Tolstoy and history; Adams, Gaddis, and a cohort of additional scholars have done the same with Chaos Theory and history — a coherent through line has until now remained undrawn. But now that we have integrated the three, we can turn and consider the implications of existing within a historical system that is chaotic.
III. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Let us assume that Tolstoy is right. History is, in fact, chaotic. What does that mean for history as a field of study? How should historians proceed, if they can “never discover all the causal chains that operate,” if their subject is a “thick, opaque, inextricably complex web of events, objects, characteristics, connected and divided by literally innumerable unidentifiable links”?[154] One possible solution, which Tolstoy identifies, is the “historical science” he envisions in War and Peace.[155] For Tolstoy, the traditional task of historians, the explanation of cause and effect, is futile, because “the connection between cause and effect has no beginning and can have no end.”[156] Instead, he believes that an ideal historical science would encourage historians to search for “the laws of history.”[157] Unfortunately, the avenue Tolstoy recommended for discovering those laws — integrating the world’s infinitesimals through a kind of historical “calculus” — remains as impossible as he understood it to be in 1867.[158] But the emergence of Chaos Theory has revealed another route for detecting order within disorderly systems. Chaoticians including Feigenbaum, Mandelbrot, and Bak managed to identify order, rules, and patterns in their chaotic systems. Historians might be able to work backwards to see whether the laws of Chaos Theory apply to their field.
One of those laws is Bak’s self–organized criticality, which Tolstoy alludes to in War and Peace. Perhaps history works similarly to sandpiles, moving in a relatively stable manner until, suddenly, it reaches a threshold of criticality where changes to a singular infinitesimal — a grain of sand, say, or a hare — can cause wild swings in outcome. Another potential rule, also observable in the chaos of sandpiles, is the power law: that “the frequency of events is inversely proportional to their intensity.”[159] With sandpiles, that means that the odds of a single grain collapsing the pile, an intense event, are lower than the odds that it causes a minor shift in the sands. As Gaddis explains, “power–law relationships” have already been found to apply “across a surprisingly wide range of phenomena extending from species annihilations and forest fires to stock market crashes and war casualties.”[160] Indeed, “power–law distribution,” as the Hungarian physicist Albert–László Barabási has found, is “a common property of many large networks.”[161] History as a whole might obey a similar set of rules to sandpiles; if studied and found to apply to the field, those rules could form two of the historical laws that Tolstoy yearned to identify in War and Peace.
Self–similarity across scale is another principle of chaos that might work as a law of history. Research has already demonstrated that the principle holds across a wide range of natural phenomena. As Gaddis notes, the French philosopher “Michel Foucault built an entire career demonstrating that patterns of authority remain much the same whether at the level of discourse, families, cities, institutions, states, nations, or cultures.”[162] For example, Foucault proves in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of a Prison that, in terms of their social dynamics, “prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons.”[163] But the principle appears to persist outside of social systems. In his book Scale, Geoffrey West observes self–similarity in a host of systems, including cities: “the two dominant components that constitute a city, its physical infrastructure and its socioeconomic activity, can both be conceptualized as approximately self–similar fractal–like network structures.”[164] Self–similarity, West concludes, is “ubiquitous across nature from galaxies and clouds to your cells, your brain, the Internet, companies, and cities.”[165] If so many of dynamics that comprise history — from social patterns to microscopic organelles to man–made networks — follow Mandelbrot’s rule, might history itself be self–similar across scale?
In The Black Swan, the enigmatic statistician Nassim Nicholas Taleb builds a compelling argument for another law of history, also derived from the premise that history is chaotic. A “Black Swan,” for Taleb, is an “outlier” of an event that carries an “extreme impact” and exhibits “retrospective (though not prospective) predictability.”[166] “A small number of Black Swans explain almost everything in our world,” Taleb contends:[167]
Just imagine how little your understanding of the world on the eve of the events of 1914 would have helped you guess what was to happen next… How about the rise of Hitler and the subsequent war? How about the precipitous demise of the Soviet bloc? How about the consequences of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism? How about the effect of the spread of the Internet? How about the market crash of 1987 (and the more unexpected recovery)? Fads, epidemics, fashion, ideas, the emergence of art genres and schools. All follow these Black Swan dynamics.[168]
Taleb’s argument rests on Poincaré’s logic. History is a “dynamical system” and thus, “the ability to project into the future… is subjected to a fundamental limitation.”[169] Black Swans reflect that uncertainty. A historical ‘Law of the Black Swan,’ therefore, would demonstrate that our abilities of forecasting are limited, enshrine the idea that history can pivot on something as small as a hare, and explain that the watershed moments of history, by and large, emerge from these unforeseeable Black Swan events.
If Tolstoy is correct and our historical system is chaotic, the few potential laws we have considered should elucidate the kinds of overarching principles historians might be able to discover, working backwards from Chaos Theory. But a question remains. Tolstoy argued that the orthodox task of historians — explaining cause and effect — is useless since each effect is beholden to an “infinity of vertically organized causes.”[170] Historians, for Tolstoy, “know too few facts” to chase their conventional goal.[171] Does that mean that the ancient aim of historians, from Herodotus onwards, must be discarded?
The French historian Marc Bloch answers a version of this question in The Historian’s Craft.[172] He poses an instructive hypothetical:
Let us suppose that a man is walking along a mountain path. He trips and falls off a precipice. For this accident to happen, the combination of a great number of determining elements was necessary, such as, among others, the existence of gravity; a terrain resulting from protracted geological changes; the laying out of a path for the purpose, let us say, of connecting a village with its summer pastures. It would, therefore, be perfectly legitimate to say that, were the laws of celestial mechanics different, had the evolution of the earth been otherwise, were alpine economy not founded upon the seasonal migration of flocks, the fall would not have happened. Nevertheless, should we inquire as to the cause, everyone would answer: “A misstep.” It is not that this antecedent was most necessary to the occurrence of the event. Many others were just as necessary. But it was distinguished from all the rest by several very striking characteristics: it occurred last; it was the least permanent, the most exceptional in the general order of things; finally, by virtue of the greater particularity, it seems the antecedent which could have been most easily avoided. For these reasons, it appears to have exerted a more direct influence upon the result, and we can scarcely avoid the feeling that it was really the sole cause of it.[173]
Bloch’s scenario refutes Tolstoy. Even if all the miniscule causes that led to the accident cannot be determined, a fatal cause — the trip — can be divined. Historians cannot hope to understand the entirety of causes that lead to an effect — “the past is never completely knowable” — but they can hope to develop a practical, if imperfect, understanding of which cause or causes were most critical to an effect.[174] The key is to distinguish between “necessary” and “exceptional” causes. Any single effect results from an infinity of necessary causes, but there often exists an exceptional cause, or set of causes, without which an unusual effect would not have occurred. Gaddis, considering Bloch’s scenario, explains that though “the placement of the path, the existence of the mountain, the effects of gravity” are “necessary” for the fall to occur, those causes are not “in themselves sufficient to explain it.”[175] Even in a chaotic system, therefore, historians can create practical arguments about cause and effect by distinguishing between necessary and sufficient causes, and by identifying exceptional ones.
What method should historians use to arrive at that distinction, to conjure practical explanations of cause and effect? The answer may be narrative. “Old–fashioned historical narrative,” Gaddis writes, allows historians to “simulate [sic] what transpired in the past.”[176] Simulating the past — dissecting, through heaps of historical evidence, the route which the past took towards the present — enables historians to “identify points of ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ at which particular actions had larger consequences than might otherwise have been expected,” he continues.[177] What Gaddis means is that narrative, as a method of reconstructing the past, endows historians with the ability craft stories like Bloch’s hypothetical, and that through those stories, historians — and their readers — may develop reasonable ideas of cause and effect that can serve as practical, if imperfect, historical explanations. Indeed, the importance of narrative as an explanatory tool has already been recognized across the wide range of scientific fields that study the “results of history,” from geology to cosmology to evolution, which means their research cannot be conducted in a laboratory.[178] Since these fields are historical, the “appropriate methods” for explaining their “inordinately complex” dynamics must “focus on narrative, not experiment,” writes the paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould in Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History.[179] Since scientists cannot study the geological evolution of the Earth, for example, in a traditional experiment, narrative allows them to reconstruct the past according to the evidence at hand. After establishing a narrative, Gould says, “we can explain an event.”[180] Historians can use narrative to do the same — to arrive at an imperfect, but as Bloch called it, “common sense,” explanation of cause and effect.[181]
Tolstoy denounces historical narratives in War and Peace because he believes they are condemned to imperfection. He is right: no narrative can ever capture the full berth of infinitesimal causes that lead to an effect. But Tolstoy misses the forest for the trees. Even though narrative can never explain cause and effect perfectly, it can still be useful. A 1946 short story from Jorge Luis Borges, titled “On Exactitude in Science,” illustrates this:
In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw that that vast Map was Useless…[182]
Narratives resemble maps. Unless they match, absurdly, the size of the area they depict, maps cannot be perfect — just ask Mandelbrot, who famously observed that the coastline of Britain was “infinite” in length — but their size and relative accuracy make them a useful tool.[183] Narratives, similarly, are practical, not perfect, but historians can use them to navigate questions of cause and effect as much as a driver on the I–95 can use a map to guide him from New Haven to New York.
Cartography, the science of mapmaking, also rebukes Tolstoy’s second criticism of narrative. Tolstoy argues in War and Peace that, whenever historical narratives compete with one another, they “mutually destroy” each other’s position.[184] “As soon as historians of different nationalities and tendencies begin to describe the same event,” he contends, “the replies they give immediately lose all meaning, for this force is understood by them… in quite contradictory ways.”[185] But, as the historian E. H. Carr makes clear in What Is History?, “it does not follow that, because a mountain appears to take on different shapes from different angles of vision, it has… no shape at all.”[186] A narrative is like a picture of a mountain, depicting the past from one angle. Although the mountain of the past might look different from another viewpoint, a single narrative can still provide a useful description of its shape. And, the more narratives, the fuller the picture becomes. Competing narratives do the opposite of “destroying” each other; each complements the next, and each enhances our understanding of the shape we are studying.[187]
The injection of chaos into their field would be far from catastrophic for historians. If the historical system we inhabit does, in fact, resemble Tolstoy’s, historians need not resign themselves to being “pathetically ignorant.”[188] The advancements of Chaos Theory have pioneered innovative methods for discovering order, in the form of patterns and laws, in disorderly systems. If historians follow the trail that Feigenbaum, Mandelbrot, Bak, and a host of other chaoticians have blazed, the discovery of historical laws — which Tolstoy believed to be the true “aim of history” — might be within reach.[189] But if such laws remain hidden, if Tolstoy is correct and the sole means of uncovering history’s secrets is through a type of historical calculus, historians can still find solace in the knowledge that the their traditional purpose, despite what Tolstoy believed, remains worthy. Even if every effect in history is beholden to the “the infinite,” the never–ending causal chain that dates back to the beginning of time, cause and effect can still be explained in a meaningful, if imperfect, way.[190] For narrative, that ancient historical technique, allows historians to reconstruct the past and then, after arriving at a common sense distinction between necessary and sufficient causes, determine the exceptional cause, the hare that shoves history towards “a distinctive, abnormal, or unforeseen course.”[191] History, in Tolstoy’s system, does not become obsolete; it remains a puzzle historians might yet complete.
A final question persists. Let us follow Tolstoy to the end of his logic. If history works as Tolstoy claims, then it is deterministic. In the future, might someone — or something, in the mold of Laplace’s ideal, omniscient demon — be able to forecast the future? Theory would respond, ‘Yes.’ And practice is hot on its heels. Over the course of the last decade, for example, our ability to forecast weather — Lorenz’ original chaotic system — has dramatically expanded, thanks to the rapid advance of artificial intelligence.[192] History is far more complicated than weather, but if it is to be forecasted, AI might be the demon to do it. If that is possible, if theory is correct, then Man will eventually have to accept the “complete absence of freedom” in his life.[193] History and free will are incompatible in this scenario. If the system is deterministic, if it is solvable, then so are our lives.
If that future ever comes about, I imagine that old Russian question will be revived: ‘What is to be done?’[194] In the last passage of War and Peace, Tolstoy offers his response. Pointing to Copernicus, who first observed that the Sun — not the Earth — was at the center of the Solar System, Tolstoy asserts that the answer lies in accepting that reason trumps feeling. Although we cannot feel the movement of Earth, reason tells us that it revolves around the Sun. Although we feel as though we are endowed with free will, reason refutes us. We must admit that we live in a world predetermined, that our lives are dependent on an infinite number of causes that both predate and surround us. As Tolstoy explains in the final sentence of War and Peace, just as Copernicus renounced “the consciousness of an unreal immobility in space” in order “to recognize a motion we did not feel,” Mankind will be forced to “renounce a freedom that does not exist” and “recognize a dependence of which we are not conscious.”[195]
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Notes
Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, trans. Anthony Briggs (London: Penguin Classics, 2016), 1103.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
George Hereford Brooke, Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia (London: Constable, 1915), 234; Edward Foord, Napoleon’s Russian Campaign of 1812 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1914), 250–258; Dominic Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon: The Battle for Europe, 1807 to 1814 (New York: Viking, 2010), 210.
John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (New York, Penguin Press, 2018), 199.
Harry Hill Walsh, “Schopenhauer’s ‘On the Freedom of the Will’ and the Epilogue to ‘War and Peace,’” The Slavonic and East European Review 57, no. 4 (October 1979): 572.
Ivan S. Turgenev, letters of 14 February and 13 April 1868, in Complete Collected Works and Letters [Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem], Letters, vol. 7 (Leningrad, 1960–1968), 64, 122.
George Rapall Noyes, Tolstoy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1918), 123–130.
Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History (London: Wiedenfelf & Nicholson, 1953), 9.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1320.
Ibid, 1322.
Ibid.
Ibid, 1325.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1323.
Ibid, 1325.
Ibid, 913.
Ibid, 1341.
Ibid, 912.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 38.
John Henry Raleigh, “Tolstoy and the Ways of History,” Novel: A Forum on Fiction 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1968), 65.
R.F. Christian, Tolstoy’s War and Peace: A Study (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 94.
Ibid, 95.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 10.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1322.
Ibid, 1266.
Ibid, 1320.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1319–20.
R.F. Christian, Tolstoy’s War and Peace, 95.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 869.
Ibid.
Ibid, 869–870.
Ibid, 869.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 870–71.
Rosamund Bartlett, Tolstoy: A Life (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011), 100.
Ibid, 103.
Orlando Figes, The Crimean War: A History (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010), 5–7.
Leo Tolstoy, “The Raid,” in The Cossacks and Other Stories, trans. David McDuff and Paul Foote (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 1–44.
Leo Tolstoy, The Sevastopol Sketches, trans. David McDuff (London: Penguin Classics, 2016), 60–61.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 46.
Ibid, 91.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 12.
G.W.F. Hegel, letter to Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer, October 13, 1806, in Hegel: The Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 114.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 12.
Ibid, 52–55.
Ibid, 57.
Walsh, “Schopenhauer’s ‘On the Freedom of the Will’ and the Epilogue to ‘War and Peace,’” 573.
Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), 7–10.
Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, 380–89.
Eugene Schuyler, “Count Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy,” Russian Antiquity [Russkaya Starina], no. 9 (St. Petersburg, 1890): 647.
John L. Bell, “Continuity and Infinitesimals,” ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Spring 2022), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/continuity/.
Stephen T. Ahearn, “Tolstoy’s Integration Metaphor from War and Peace,” The American Mathematical Monthly 112, no. 7 (Aug.–Sep. 2005): 631–638, https://www.jstor.org/stable/30037547.
Bell, “Continuity and Infinitesimals.”
Boris Eikhenbaum, Tolstoy in the Sixties, trans. Duffield White (Ann Arbor, MI: Ardis, 1982), 228–30.
Ibid.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 912.
Ibid.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 911.
Raleigh, “Tolstoy and the Ways of History,” 58.
Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” 81.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 912.
Berlin, “The Hedgehog and the Fox,” 34.
Pierre–Simon Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, 6th ed., trans. F. W. Truscott and F. L. Emory (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), 4.
William Grimes, “Edward N. Lorenz, a Meteorologist and a Father of Chaos Theory, Dies at 90,” New York Times, April 17, 2008, https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/17/us/17lorenz.html?ref=us.
James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 15–17.
Jeremy Gray, Henri Poincaré: A Scientific Biography (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 3–16.
Gleick, Chaos, 37.
I use ‘basic,’ here, because the next few pages are meant to serve as a primer on Chaos Theory; they are nowhere near a complete account of the field and its origins.
Gleick, Chaos, 21.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Edward N. Lorenz, “Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow,” Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 20, no. 2 (1963): 130–141, https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0469(1963)020<0130:DNF>2.0.CO;2.
Gleick, Chaos, 16.
Michel Hénon, “On the Prevalence of Aperiodicity in Simple Systems,” in Global Analysis, ed. Miroslav Grmela and Jerrold E. Marsden (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1979), 55.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Gleick, Chaos, 6.
Brian R. Hunt and James A. Yorke, “Maxwell on Chaos,” Nonlinear Science Today 3, no. 1 (1993), 2.
Lewis Campbell and William Garnett, The Life of James Clerk Maxwell (London: Macmillan, 1882; repr., New York: Johnson Reprint, 1969), 440.
It is ‘infamous’ in the sense that it continues to bedevil mathematicians, who consider it to be, in most of its forms, unsolvable. But its fame also transcends mathematics: it is the title of a bestselling science fiction novel by the Chinese writer Cixin Liu, which has since been adapted into a Netflix series of the same name.
Jean Mawhin, review of Poincaré and the Three–Body Problem, by June Barrow–Green, Isis 89, no. 2 (June 1998): 345-346, https://www.jstor.org/stable/237789 (accessed March 19, 2025).
Henri Poincaré, Science et méthode (Paris: Flammanon, 1908), trans. Francis Maitland, Science and Method (New York: Dover, 1952), 68.
Ibid.
Ibid.
June Barrow–Green, Poincaré and the Three Body Problem, History of Mathematics, vol. 11 (Providence, RI: American Mathematical Society, 1997).
Edward N. Lorenz, “Predictability; Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?” (lecture, 139th Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Sheraton Park Hotel, Wilmington Room, Washington, DC, December 29, 1972), 1.
Ibid, 2.
Tien–Yien Li and James A. Yorke, “Period Three Implies Chaos,” The American Mathematical Monthly 82, no. 10 (December 1975): 985, accessed March 23, 2025, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-9890%28197512%2982%3A10%3C985%3APTIC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H.
Li and Yorke, “Period Three Implies Chaos,” 985–87.
Gleick, Chaos, 73.
‘Dynamics’ is shorthand for ‘dynamical systems,’ or systems that change with time. What Smale is saying, then, is that scientists started to realize that chaos is implicit in most systems that consider the effects of time.
Stephen Smale, “Finding a Horseshoe on the Beaches of Rio,” The Mathematical Intelligencer 20, no. 1 (1998): 39–44.
Heath Dimsey, Lawrence K. Forbes, Andrew P. Bassom, and Courtney Quinn, “A Mathematical Model of the Bray–Liebhafsky Reaction,” Proceedings of the Royal Society A, published May 29, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1098/rspa.2023.0964; Robert M. May, “Simple Mathematical Models with Very Complicated Dynamics,” Nature 261, no. 5560 (1976): 459–467.
Gleick, Chaos, 179.
Ibid.
Mitchell J. Feigenbaum, “The Onset of Turbulence: Orderly Behavior in Nonlinear Systems,” Los Alamos Science 1 (1980): 5.
Ibid, 4.
Trinh Xuan Thuan, Chaos and Harmony: Perspectives on Scientific Revolutions of the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 102.
Gleick, Chaos, 133–36.
Allen G. Hart, James L. Hook, and Jonathan H. P. Dawes, “Embedding and Approximation Theorems for Echo State Networks,” Neural Networks 128 (August 2020): 234–247, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neunet.2020.05.013.
Gleick, Chaos, 150.
Peter Tyson, “Goodbye to the Father of Fractals,” Inside NOVA, October 19, 2010, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/insidenova/2010/10/goodbye-to-the-father-of-fractals.html.
The equation for the Mandelbrot set is (z² + c), where ‘c’ is a complex number and ‘z’ starts at zero. The ensuing image produced on a two–dimensional plane is infinitely complex, but it is also self–similar across scale: zooming in on one part of the image will reveal a smaller version of the overall structure, whose specific shape hinges entirely on the initial value chosen for ‘c.’ For more detail, see S. B. Cooper, Benedikt Löwe, and Andrea Sorbi, eds., New Computational Paradigms: Changing Conceptions of What is Computable (New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2007), 450.
Benoît B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1982), 60–64.
John H. Guckenheimer, “Edward Norton Lorenz. 23 May 1917—16 April 2008,” Biographical Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society 55 (2009): 144, https://doi.org/10.1098/rsbm.2009.0004.
Gleick, Chaos, 118.
Stuart A. Kauffman and Sonke Johnsen, “Coevolution to the Edge of Chaos: Coupled Fitness Landscapes, Poised States, and Coevolutionary Avalanches,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 149, no. 4 (1991): 467.
Kenneth Chang, “Per Bak, 54, Physicist of Sudden Change, Dies,” New York Times, October 29, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/29/world/per-bak-54-physicist-of-sudden-change-dies.html.
Per Bak, How Nature Works: The Science of Self-Organized Criticality (New York: Copernicus, 1996), 31–37.
Ibid, 87.
Per Bak, Chao Tang, and Kurt Wiesenfeld, “Self-Organized Criticality: An Explanation of 1/f Noise,” Physical Review Letters 59, no. 4 (1987): 381.
Bak, How Nature Works, 11.
Poincaré, Science et méthode, 68.
Gleick, Chaos, 181.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1325.
Sidney Hook, “The Contemporary Significance of Hegel’s Philosophy,” Philosophical Review 41, no. 3 (1932), 246–49, https://doi.org/10.2307/2179783.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 911.
Ibid.
Raleigh, “Tolstoy and the Ways of History,” 55.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 912.
Ibid, 1325.
Lieven, Russia Against Napoleon, 211–215.
Lorenz, “Predictability; Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off a Tornado in Texas?”, 1.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 32.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 912.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 29.
Ibid.
Poincaré, Science et méthode, 68.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1259.
Ibid, 912.
Ibid, 914.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 16.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 911.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 32.
Lee Trepanier, “Consciousness, Memory, and History in Tolstoy’s War and Peace,” Perspectives on Political Science 40, no. 1 (January 2011): 35–37, https://doi.org/10.1080/10457097.2011.536734.
Berlin has an excuse: The Hedgehog and The Fox, which examines Tolstoy’s views on history, was published in 1953, almost two decades before Chaos Theory revolutionized the sciences.
Barnhart, Joe. “Tolstoy on Free Will.” The Personalist Forum 11, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 46. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20708703.
M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Stephen H. Kellert, In the Wake of Chaos: Unpredictable Order in Dynamical Systems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
Ibid, 110.
John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 76.
Gaddis, The Landscape of History, 64.
Ibid.
Ibid, 57, 74.
Ibid, 85.
Ibid, 76.
N. Katherine Hayles, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), 22–25.
Ibid, 61, 75.
Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1918), 162, 325.
Ibid, 328.
Ibid, 329.
Although Adams privately circulated copies of his autobiography as early as 1907, his work was not officially published until after his death in 1918.
Gaddis, The Landscape of History, 73.
Gaddis, On Grand Strategy, 211.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 34, 69.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 911–12.
Ibid, 1353.
Ibid, 914.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 34.
Gaddis, The Landscape of History, 85.
Ibid.
Albert–László Barabási and Réka Albert, “Emergence of Scaling in Random Networks,” Science 286, no. 5439 (October 15, 1999): 509, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.286.5439.509.
Gaddis, The Landscape of History 83.
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 228.
Geoffrey West, Scale: The Universal Laws of Life, Growth, and Death in Organisms, Cities, and Companies (New York: Penguin Press, 2017), 315.
Ibid, 91.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (New York: Random House, 2007), 16–17.
Ibid, 17.
Ibid, 18.
Ibid, 274.
Raleigh, “Tolstoy and the Ways of History,” 60.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 29.
Marc Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, trans. Peter Putnam (New York: Vintage Books, 1953), 190.
Ibid, 190–91.
Gaddis, The Landscape of History, 65.
Ibid, 97.
Ibid, 81, 104.
Ibid, 64.
Stephen Jay Gould, Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York: W. W. Norton, 1989), 249.
Ibid, 249.
Ibid, 250.
Bloch, The Historian’s Craft, 191.
Jorge Luis Borges, “On Exactitude in Science,” in Collected Fictions, trans. Andrew Hurley (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 325.
Benoît Mandelbrot, “How Long Is the Coast of Britain? Statistical Self-Similarity and Fractional Dimension,” Science 156, no. 3775 (May 5, 1967): 636.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1321–22.
Ibid.
E. H. Carr, What Is History? (New York: Vintage Books, 1961), 26–27.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1321–22.
Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox, 29.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 912.
Raleigh, “Tolstoy and the Ways of History,” 65.
Gaddis, The Landscape of History, 99.
Eric Niiler, “AI Is Learning to Predict the Weather,” Wall Street Journal, August 6, 2024, https://www.wsj.com/tech/ai/ai-is-learning-to-predict-the-weather-8968fa7c.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1352.
‘What is to Be Done’ is the title of several works from Russian authors including Tolstoy in 1886, Nikolai Chernyshevsky in 1863, and Lenin in 1902.
Tolstoy, War and Peace, 1358.